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ABSTRACT
A cash based funds flow model is used to discriminate between
failed and nonf ailed companies. We discovered cash flow from opera-
tions does not provide a reliable signal for classifying companies,
which supports recent findings of Casey and Bartczak. Our analysis
shows funds flow components or financial ratios provide dependable
signals for classifying companies. Finally, we found a combination of
funds flow measures and ratios with particular emphasis on dividends,
investment and receivables supply management reliable information for
judging the condition of a company's financial health.

CASH FLOW— IF IT'S NOT THE BOTTOM LINE, WHAT IS?
Scientists, astronauts, navigators, meterologists and members of
the corporate management team have a common goal of continuously
searching for signals that will aid them in predicting what lies ahead.
A primary concern of the above professionals is the reliability of the
signals being received. For example, corporate management, financial
executives, accountants, credit analysts and financial analysts have
held the view that past cash flow trends provide reliable signals for
predicting a firm's future success or failure. In what may have been a
surprising finding, Casey and Bartczak (CB) [2] reported cash flow from
operations (CFO) was not a reliable measure for predicting corporate
bankruptcy. CB's research found financial ratios provided superior
information to CFO for explaining financial failure. They stated there
are many other factors that may signal failure, such as company indebt-
edness, lack of access to financial markets, low salability of capital
assets and a low reservoir of liquid assets.
In studying the financial explanations of bankruptcy, we selected a
broader base of cash flow components than CB. Although our research
findings are not directly comparable to CB's due to differences in
objectives and experimental design, our eclectic cash flow measures
provide unique insights into the prediction of financial failure.
Cash Based Flows
We chose a cash based funds flow model to explain corporate failure
because integrated cash flow information reflects the outcome of major
financial decisions of management. Cash flows are considered to be
more sensitive to changes in short term trends than information based
on accrual accounting assumptions. Finally, leading valuation theories
are based on discounted future cash flows.
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Previous bankruptcy studies have used financial ratios to predict
financial failure, but the theoretical rationale for selecting specific
ratios has not been explicitly developed. This ad hoc search process
for selecting ratios has resulted in each study finding a unique set of
ratios for predicting financial failure. To offset the criticism raised
concerning these ad hoc procedures, we selected cash flow components
that utilize financial information available in a firm's balance sheets
and income statements. Our concern for cash flow measures caused us to
decompose cash based accounting information into functionally oriented
components. In contrast, CB were only interested in the classification
ability of CFO and they utilized the traditional working capital based
funds flow model to calculate the CFO measure.
THE MODEL
Rationale
In an accounting context, cash inflows equal cash outflows. The
level and speed of the cash flows reflect managements' operating,
investment and financing decisions. The distributions of the com-
ponents generating cash inflows and outflows are signals that reflect
the resource allocation decisions of management. The trends of the
changes in cash inflow and outflow components provide measures for
discriminating between financially successful and financially failing
firms.
Components
The model we use to identify funds flow measures was developed by
Erich Kelfert [4], After extensive use of Kelfert's model, we redesigned
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it to have eight major components. The eight net funds flow components
are operations (NOFF), working capital (NWCFF), financial (NFFF), fixed
coverage expenses, i.e., interest and lease payments (FCE), capital
expenditures (NIFF), dividends (DIV), other asset and liability flows
(NOTHER) and the change in cash and marketable securities (CC). The
interrelationship among the components is quite complex. Excepting
changes in cash and marketable securities, a source (S) would be a
positive number and a use (U) would be negative. As a first cut, the
following equation presents a formulation of the cash based funds flow
model and the most likely source/use classification of each component
for a financially healthy firm.
NOFF + NWCFF + NFFF + FCE + NIFF + DIV + NOTHER - CC =
+ - + ---- +
(S) (U) (S) (U) (U) (U) (U) (U)
The accounting convention underlying the funds statement results in
total net inflow of funds (TNIF) being equal to the absolute value of
total net outflow of funds (TNOF). We have simplified the notation by
substituting the expression total net cash flow (TNCF) for TNIF and
TNOF. Thus by dividing each funds flow component by TNCF, one can
determine the percentage each component contributes to the total.
Example
An example that compares Deere & Company to Massey-Ferguson (MF)
illustrates how the trends of funds flow components aid in determining
if a company is financially healthy or weak. Performance trends for
the period 1978-1982 of the eight funds flow components are presented
in Exhibit 1.
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The trend of the net operating funds flow components are located
in the upper left hand corner of Exhibit 1. The graphic presentation
shows that approximately 80% to 90% of Deere 's total net inflow came
from operations in three years and only 45% to 55% was generated in the
other two years. Although Deere' s operating inflow component was rela-
tively erratic, its level was always markedly greater than Massey
Ferguson's. Massey's operating flows were 62% of total inf lows in 1979
in contrast to being -28% of total outflows in 1982. Net outflows are
shown as negative values in Exhibit 1. The trend of the net operating
flows was declining for both companies, but is is apparent that Deere,
the financially stronger company, received a significantly higher per-
cent of their inflows from operations.
Frequently the largest percentage of a firm's total outflows go to
capital investment. However, Exhibit 1 shows the percentage of Deere 's
total net outflows going to investment declined from -47% in 1979 to -12%
in 1982. For Massey Ferguson the percentage of total outflow going to
investment dropped from -24% in 1978 to approximately zero in 1980 and
remained at that level through 1982. Graphically, Massey's decline in
investment can be related to the shortage of operating inflows
available for investment. The decrease in investment at Deere was also
related to decline in operating inflows.
The interdependence among the cash flow components is most evident
in the net financing flow component (NFFF), which measures the increase
or decrease in total debt and common stock. The path of the net
financing flows for Deere in Exhibit 1 reflects an offset to the pat-
tern of operating inflows. When net operating flows declined at Deere,
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the management increased outside financing in order to maintain its on-
going operations and dividends. Exhibit 1 highlights Massey's heavy
commitment to outside financing in 1979-1980 and a dramatic change in
1981.
The net working capital path has a unique significance for Deere
and Massey Ferguson. Although net operating inflows and net investment
outflows were declining as a percentage of the total, net working capi-
tal at Deere ranged from -15% to -30% of total net outflow in three of
the five years. In 1979 it was a small outflow and in 1981 a small
inflow . In contrast, at Massey Ferguson net working capital was a
major inflow in three of the five years. By disaggregating the five
components of working capital a better understanding of the funds flow
picture emerges. Exhibit 2 presents the five components of net working
capital. Short-term borrowing is included in Exhibit 2, but by defini-
tion it is a financing flow. In 1981 when Massey's fixed coverage
expenses soared and the short-term borrowing had to be repaid, manage-
ment reduced inventory and receivables and they respectively composed
71% and 5% of total net inflows. In 1982 receivables composed 66% of
total net inflows and inventories 28%. In comparison the change in
receivables at Deere were a primary net outflow in each year except
1979 and the change in inventories were a small inflow in three of the
five years. The key observation is that receivables and inventories
were major inflows for Massey when the financial crisis hit. In
contrast Deere 's receivables required a major outflow of funds in four
of the five years.
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Exhibit 1 shows dividends at Deere represented between -9% and -16%
of the total outflow of funds. In contrast, the dividend outflow as
a percentage of the total at Massey ranged from -1% to -9% during the
period, which was significantly smaller than the dividend outflow at
Deere. Massey was paying dividends to the Canadian government for
external financing received throughout the period.
The percentage of total outflow needed to cover fixed financial
obligations highlights a major difference between Deere and Massey
Ferguson. The largest outflow of funds for Massey was to meet their
fixed coverage expenditures. Exhibit 1 shows fixed coverage ranged
from -50% to -88% of the total outflow of funds. Fixed coverage expen-
ditures at Deere ranged from -15% in 1979 to about -30% in 1981.
Research Studv
Our analysis uses twelve funds flow measures to classify failed
and nonfailed companies. We substituted the five working capital
components for the single net working capital component, omitted the
component CC/TNF to avoid a statistical problem of overidentif ication
and added a size measure, total net flows as a percentage of total
assets, (TNF/TA). The analyses uses these twelve funds flow components
to compare the performance of 33 financially healthy companies to 33
bankrupt firms for a period up to three years before failure. The
failed companies were selected from the 1981 Standard and Poor's
COMPUSTAT Annual Industrial Research File . Initially there were 114
failed companies for the period 1970-1981, but only 33 of these failed
companies had complete financial data required for this study. Each
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failed company was matched with a nonfailed company in the same in-
dustry and approximately the same size in both assets and sales. Our
analysis examined the results for periods of one, two, and three years
before failures and an average of the three years. We are reporting
the results of one year before failure and the mean of the three years.
Findings
The mean and deviation of each cash flow ratio for the 33 failed
and nonfailed companies are reported in Exhibit 3. A brief review of
the data indicates there is generally a marked difference between the
means of the bankrupt companies and the financially nealthy companies.
For example using the one year before failure data, the means of the
operating inflows are 55.6% of total inflow for the nonfailed companies
and 16.3% for the failed companies; the means of the total outflow
going to investment are -36.7% and -16.3%, respectively; dividends are
-9.2% and -1.8% of the outflow, respectively; and receivables are -16.9%
of total ou t f 1 ow for the nonfailed companies and 10.0% of total inflow
for the bankrupt companies. The standard deviations are substantially
larger for the funds flow components of the failed companies. It is
not uncommon, especially among the working capital components, for the
mean of the failed companies to be an inflow and the mean of the non-
failed to be an outflow.
A conditional probability model called probit generates coef-
ficients from the funds flow components and uses them to predict the
probability of failure or nonfailure of the 66 companies. The classi-
fication results are reported in Exhibit 4. They show 79% of the failed
companies are classified correctly using data that are either one year
before failure or a mean of three years before failure. The model
classified 88% of the financially healthy companies correctly using
data one year before failure and 79% with the three year average.
The probit analysis calculates the weight each of these funds flow
component contributes to the overall prediction of failure or non-
failure. The probit coefficients are similar to the coefficients that
compose the Z score developed by Altman [l] and they are reported in
Exhibit 5. Using the one year before failure data, we discovered the
investment, dividend and receivables components were statistically
significant at the 5% level of confidence. Figure 1 provides the
distribution of these three funds flow components. The distribution
of the percentage of total outflow going to capital investment reveals
that financially healthy companies invest a substantially higher per-
centage of funds in plant and equipment than the firms that failed.
The economic rationale underlying this finding makes it intuitively
appealing.
The distribution of the outflow of funds to dividends are in Figure
1 and they are left skewed. For the financially healthy companies the
average dividend composed -9.2% of the total outflow and ranged from
to -40% with six of the companies paying no dividends. The dividend
component for the failed companies ranged between and -25%, and on
average was -1.8% of total outflow with 23 of the companies not paying
dividends. In general, failing firms tend to experience a shortfall of
inflows from operations, thereby causing a reduction in dividend
payments.
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When classifying the performance of accounts receivables, Figure 1
shows the financially healthy companies were investing in receivables
while the bankrupt firms were reducing the level of receivables in
order to generate cash inflows. On average approximately -17% of the
outflow went to finance receivables for the nonf ailed firms, while 10%
of total cash inflow for failed companies came from receivables. The
cash flows related to receivables are vastly different between the
financially healthy and failed firms.
Using a three year mean for each component indicates the dividend
component is again significant at the 5% level of confidence in
classifying failed and nonf ailed companies. The analysis also found
the ratio of total net flow/total assets, a measure of cash flow as a
percent of total assets, was statistically significant. The receivables
and investment components were not significant because the distribu-
tions of the failed companies' ratios were disbursed across a wide range.
The findings clearly show that regardless of time periods used
before failure, dividends are important in classifying failed and non-
failed companies. The stability of net cash flow, receivables and
investments change dramatically as a company approaches failure. That
is, receivables and investment components do not provide reliable
signals for classifying failure two or three years before the event,
but they become reliable measures one year prior to bankruptcy.
Our equivalent to CB's cash flow from operations measure includes
three cash based funds flow components, namely, operations, working
capital and fixed coverage expenses. The probit coefficients in
Exhibit 5 for the three equivalent components corroborate CB's finding
-10-
that CFO does not provide a reliable signal for discriminating between
failed and nonf ailed companies. The distribution of these three CFO
equivalents are presented in Figure 2. The graphics illustrate that
the variance of the operating, working capital and fixed coverage com-
ponents for the failed companies is markedly greater than for the finan-
cially healthy companies. There are failed companies that have CFO
measures quite similar to nonf ailed companies, and there are others
that are totally dissimilar. Our findings also indicate it is not pos-
sible to use the CFO measures to discriminate between failed and non-
failed companies.
Ratios
CB found that a set of six accrual accounting based ratios provided
more reliable information than CFO for classifying failed and nonfailed
companies. Also previous bankruptcy studies have relied totally on
financial ratios to predict bankruptcy. In order to determine if finan-
cial ratios are a more reliable source of information than the funds
flow components, we selected seven ratios that most frequently predicted
bankruptcy from fourteen previous studies, 13]. We also included a
ratio for size and one for market value. These nine ratios are net
income/total assets (NI/TA), total debt/total assets (TD/TA), cash
flow/total debt (CF/TD), net working capital/ total assets (NWC/TA),
current assets/current liabilities (CA/CL), cash plus marketable
securities/current liabilities (C/CL), natural log of total assets
(Jin TA), market value of equity/book value of equity (MVE/BVE).
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When the twelve funds flow components and the nine ratios are com-
bined, the probit results show that the dividends component is signifi-
cant at the 5% level of confidence and the investment and receivables
components are significant at the 10% level. None of the ratios are
significant. The data used to calculate the ratios and funds flow com-
ponents are from the one year before failure sample. The implication
of this finding is that dividend, investment and receivable flows offer
reliable information for discriminating between failed and nonfailed
companies. They provide dependable signals for analysts and management
to identify possible candidates for financial failure.
A strong discriminating test called the log likelihood statistic
was used to determine if ratios provide additional discriminating
information when combined with funds flow components or vice versa.
We tested the nine ratios and the twelve funds flow components as a
group. The results for both the ratios and the cash flow components
were significant. When the nine ratios were added to the twelve funds
flow measures, the increase in the explanatory power of the combined
measures was significant at the 5% level. Adding the funds flow com-
ponents to the nine ratios resulted in the combined discriminating
power being significant at the 1% level. Although both measures pro-
vide additional discriminating information when they are combined, the
funds flow components provide a slightly more reliable signal.
Conclusion
Our study supports the findings of Casey and Bartczak that cash
flow from operations does not provide reliable signals for discriminating
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between failed and nonfailed companies. CFO is not the bottom line for
discriminating between financially healthy and bankrupt companies. We
discovered that cash based funds flow model components or financial
ratios provide management and analysts reliable signals for classifying
failed and nonfailed companies. Our analysis shows when ratios are
combined with funds flow measures, or vice versa, the discriminating
reliability of the signal improves. However, the confidence level is
higher with the addition of funds flow information. We discovered
dividend, investment and receivable funds flow measures provide signi-
ficant information in classifying failed and nonfailed companies. Thus
CFO is not the bottom line, but a combination of funds flow and ratios
with particular emphasis on dividends, investment and receivables funds
flow components provide reliable information for judging the condition
of a company's financial health.
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EXHIBIT 2. TREND OF SHORT-RUN FUNDS FLOW COMPONENTS
FOR DEERE & COMPANY AND MASSEY FERGUSON 1978-1982
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EXHIBIT 3
MEAN NET FUNDS FLOW COMPONENTS /TOTAL NET FLOW
FOR FAILED AND NONFAILED COMPANIES
ONE YEAR BEFORE FAILURE
Net Funds Flow Component/
Divided by Total Net Flow (TNF)
Operations
Working Capital
Other A&L
Financing
Fixed Coverage
Investment
Dividends
Cash & M.S.
Receivables
Inventory
Other CA
Payables
Other CL
Group 1 Group 2
Failed Nonf ailed
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
.163 .528 .556 .247
.130 .453 -.129 .344
-.044 .258 .047 .178
.167 .490 .140 .369
-.152 .127 -.080 .095
-.163 .288 -.367 .267
-.018 .050 -.092 .103
-.081 .290 -.074 .243
.100 .351 -.169 .257
.013 .485 -.126 .246
.017 .148 -.020 .065
.170 .559 .101 .393
-.172 .680 .085 .241
TNF/TA .257 .140 .226 .025
MEAN OF VARIABLE FOR THREE YEARS BEFORE FAILURE
Operating
Working Capital
Other A&L
Financing
Fixed Coverage
Investment
Dividends
Cash & M.S.
Receivables
Inventory
Other CA
Payables
Other CL
288 .344 .588 .228
007 .291 -.102 .197
018 .202 .029 .064
120 .342 .090 .211
126 .100 -.079 .062
220 .170 -.364 .211
002 .049 -.093 .10o
029 .145 -.068 .108
013 .304 -.151 .195
061 .211 -.117 .167
002 .022 -.015 .032
147 .260 .139 .212
089 .389 .041 .250
TNF/TA 255 136 .219 .07b
EXHIBIT 4
CLASSIFICATION MATRICES FOR FAILED AND NONFAILED COMPANIES
USING PROBIT MODEL AND TWELVE FUNDS FLOW COMPONENTS
ONE YEAR BEFORE FAILURE
Probit (Pr < .5)
Failed
Nonf ailed
Total
Probit (Pr < .5)
Failed
Nonf ailed
Total
Number Percent Percent
Correct Correct Error N_
26 78.8 21.2 33
29 87.9 12.1 33
59 83.3 16.7 66
THREE YEAR AVERAGE BEFORE FAILURE
26 78.8 21.2 33
2b 78.8 21.2 33
52 78.8 21.2 66
EXHIBIT 5
PROBIT COEFFICIENTS
Net Funds Flow One Year Three Year
Components Divided Berore Average Before
by Total Net Flow Failure Failure
Constant 1.567 -.073
Operating 1.257 1.630
Other -1.040 -6.094
Financing 1.580 -.008
Fixed Coverage 2.713 -2.041
Investment 3.678* 4.245
Dividend 13.133* 17.691*
Receivables 4.339* 3.b5b
Inventory 1.253 2.115
Other CA 2.490 4.532
Payables 2.086 2.649
Other CL .56 -.470
Total Net Flow/
Total Assets 0.129 7.362*
*Asymptotic T ratio was significant at the .05 level of confidence
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